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Since 2013, I have offered a course at the University of Otago's
Faculty of Law entitled 'Animals and the Law'. Given New Zealand's
reliance upon agriculture,' and the fact it can lay claim to 'leading the
way' with regards to animal welfare,2 it is perhaps surprising that it is
currently the only course focusing on Animal Law offered at any of
New Zealand's six law schools. I am not, however, a trailblazer. Until
he left for the University of Alberta in 2010, Professor Peter Sankoff
offered such a course at the University of Auckland, and Dr Ian
Robertson has offered a course intermittently at the University of
Auckland and University of Canterbury. Despite those precedents,
however, I designed my course from 'scratch'. In this short paper, I will
describe the structure of the course and explain my reasoning for the
content I have included in the course. There is value in sharing syllabus
materials and outlining one approach to a subject with many different
entry points, and it is my hope that such an account may assist other
Australasian legal academics if and when they decide to create their
own courses on this important and burgeoning subject.
II THEMES AND GOALS
The course I teach is described and advertised as follows:
Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Otago. I would like to thank and
acknowledge Dr Meg Good, University of Tasmania, for suggesting that I write about
this topic. I am also very grateful for the thorough and constructive advice for the
improvement of this paper provided by Dr Joanna Kyriakakis, Monash University,
and an anonymous peer reviewer.
Agriculture comprises 6.0 per cent of New Zealand's gross domestic product
(December 2015 quarter, <stats.govt.nz>) whereas, for comparison, it comprises 2.3
per cent of Australia's gross domestic product (in 2015), Peter J Blatt, 'Australia's
'five strong pillar economy': agriculture' The Conversation (online), 27 April 2015,
<http://theconversation.com/australias-five-strong-pillar-economy-agriculture-
40388>.
2 World Animal Protection, 'New Zealand Leads the Way on our Animal Protection
Index' (Media Release, 21 January 2015)
<http://www.worldanimalprotection.org.nz/news/new-zealand-leads-way-our-
animal-protection-index>.
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Non-human animals play a number of important roles in our lives. They
form the backbone of the New Zealand economy. Some of us treat them as
companions. Many of us eat them. Accordingly, just as it does with many
other aspects of our lives, the law helps to define and regulate our
relationships with animals. This [course] outlines and seeks to critically
examine the law's role in this area. It examines the philosophical
justifications behind the modem legal treatment and regulation of non-
human animals generally, then looks at the legal structures that regulate the
treatment, control and welfare of animals in New Zealand.
This hopefully makes the goal of my course clear: not simply to
describe the regulation of the relationship between humans and non-
human animalS 3 in this jurisdiction, but also to critique that regulation.
The critique takes the form of questioning the fundaments of that
regulation, introducing students to alternative paradigms and
frameworks, in a way not dissimilar to the critical legal studies
movement. Just as the critical legal studies movement critiqued (inter
alia) the notion of adjudicative neutrality, and argued that 'every judge
is a political actor effecting a political agenda',4 students in this course
are exposed to writers that argue that far from having an animal-centric
focus, animal welfare regulation is based upon and designed to facilitate
the exploitation of animals by humans. The normative critique is then
supplemented by a descriptive analysis of the regulation and its
shortfalls. Although for many, this might seem an obvious approach to
teaching such a course, it is not the only approach available. Those who
take a purely 'welfarist' approach to animal law might accept the status
quo as legitimate; instead preferring to focus on the structure and
application of that regulation. Such courses might critique issues
surrounding that regulation - e.g., the lack of enforcement of animal
welfare legislation, or the vagueness of duties imposed upon those in
charge of animals - whilst accepting the underlying premise of welfare
statutes without further consideration. Alternatively, courses on animal
law may take the opposite approach, criticising welfarism and instead
choosing to focus entirely on, e.g., the legal status of animals as
property; considering whether animals ought to have the status of legal
persons; analysing whether animals have the capacity to act as rights
bearers; and what a change in those paradigms might look like in a
practical sense.
In my view, and as this paper will detail, an animal law course works
best when it adopts a hybrid of these two opposing approaches. In this
way, it borrows a great deal from the critical legal studies pedagogy:
'[h]ow can we hope to have our students understand legal rules and
processes without looking behind the fagade, to see what is really going
on when judges [and legislators] construct these pictures?' To
understand the deficiencies present in New Zealand's regulation of
Hereon in, although acknowledging the inaccuracy in distinguishing 'human' from
'animal', I shall use the term 'animal' as shorthand for 'non-human animal'.
4 Ian Ward, Introduction to Critical Legal Theory (Cavendish Publishing, 2nd ed,
2004), 144-145.
Jerry L Anderson, 'Law School Enters the Matrix: Teaching Critical Legal Studies'
(2004) 54 Journal of Legal Education 201, 205.
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animal welfare, it is necessary to explore both the historic context of the
legal relationship between humans and animals, and the assumptions
that pervade our modern approach to that regulation. It is only then that
the systemic critiques of a regulatory environment that is otherwise
internationally lauded6 make sense.
III CONTENT AND RESOURCES
In order to build on those themes, I have split the course into two
parts. The first explores the legal and moral status of animals generally;
the second explores how that status is manifested in the New Zealand
legal system, specifically with regards to the regulation of animal
welfare.
A Part A: The Moral and Legal Status ofAnimals
Before looking to the historic context of animal law, providing
students with an outline of the different approaches available to tackle
the subject is useful. Jerrold Tannenbaum's 2013 paper, 'What is
Animal Law?' 7 provides an excellent pr6cis of the difficulties facing a
subject that has no homogenous or universal definition, and argues for
the rejection of a rights-centred definition (which possibly equates best
to the popular conception of the subject) in favour of a more descriptive
approach.8 Thomas Kelch's excellent two-part 'A Short History of
(Mostly) Western Animal Law' 9 then provides the necessary historic
context presented in five periods: Ancient; Medieval; Renaissance;
Recent Modern and Modern. Only when we understand what caused
the advent of modern animal cruelty statutes in the nineteenth century
can we understand their modern counterparts are simply stratified
versions of those early attempts, and why there is thus resistance from
both activist and scientific communities to the status quo.
The historic context provided by Kelch is a useful starting point to
provide students with (often, their first) exposure to alternative
paradigms. After providing the historical context to animal law, I
choose to begin with an analysis and critique of Peter Singer's 'All
Animals Are Equal', 10 for both its persuasiveness and its historical
importance. As arguably the most influential paper in this area of study
of its time, Singer's piece introduces the concept of speciesism and is
valuable for explaining assumptions made in modern animal welfare
6 World Animal Protection, 'New Global Index Shows New Zealand a World Leader
in Animal Welfare' (25 November 2014)
<www.worldanimalprotection.org.nz/news/new-global-index-shows-new-zealand-
world-leader-animal-welfare>.
7 Jerrold Tannenbaum, 'What is Animal Law?' (2013) 61 Cleveland State Law Review
891.
Ibid 933.
9 Thomas G Kelch, 'A Short History of (Mostly) Western Animal Law: Part I' (2012)
19 Animal Law 23; Thomas G Kelch, 'A Short History of (Mostly) Western Animal
Law: Part II' (2012) 19 Animal Law 347.
'o Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Ecco Press, first published 1975, 2009 ed), 1.
2017
232 LEGAL EDUCATION REVIEW
legislation. Often, while students will find his argument (and, it must be
said, his now anachronistic examples and terminology") very jarring,
they are engaged by questioning some fundamental assumptions in the
human-animal relationship. Paired with Singer's piece, Richard
Posner's attempted defence of speciesism 12 gives voice to some
students' inevitable intuitive rejection of Singer's argument. Posner's
piece, whilst ultimately failing to engage with the arguments of Singer
and Steven Wise, does well to illustrate the emotional complexity of the
issues raised by the concept of speciesism.
After introducing students to the concept of speciesism, the case is
made for animal rights, which while not within Singer's utilitarian
paradigm, is a natural successor to the cause he helped foment. 13 Whilst
there is a vast array of sources to choose from, including the seminal
works of Tom Reganl4 and Wise," Gary Francione's shorter form 6 of
the argument encapsulated in his text Animals, Property, and the Law1 7
outlines in compelling detail the core argument of the abolitionist
movement. By using examples that still have contemporary resonance
(the article was written in 1995), Francione shows the centrality of the
property status of animals as the core problem in anti-cruelty statutes
and the welfarist position itself. Most importantly, Francione illustrates
the problem of balancing the interests of humans and animals when the
former group is endowed with rights, and the latter is not; the outcome
is almost predetermined in humans' favour.
Robert Garner's pragmatic response to the abolitionist movement
provides an opportunity to students who have felt instinctively uneasy
with Singer's argument against speciesism and Francione's argument
for animal rights to defend the status quo. " By accepting the
philosophical strength of Singer's thesis, Garner is able to maintain a
defence of welfarism and welfare legislation from a practical
perspective. His arguments focus on the flexibility of the term
'unnecessary suffering' to evolve and improve welfare conditions, and
that the property status of animals is not a direct cause of the quality of
animal welfare legislation (or lack thereof).19 They provide a good
response to the philosophically strong but, arguably, practically weak
position of the thinkers the students will have examined thus far.
Ibid 19. Singer's use of 'severely retarded' for referring to intellectual disability is
one such unfortunate example.
12 Richard A Posner, 'Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and Pragmatic
Perspectives' in Cass R Sunstein and Martha C Nussbaum (eds), Animal Rights:
Current Debates and New Directions (Oxford University Press, 2004) 51.
' Tannenbaum, above n 7, 910-911.
14 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (University of California Press, 2004).
' Steven M Wise, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals (Basic Books,
2009).
16 Gary L Francione, 'Animal Rights and Legal Welfarism "Unnecessary" Suffering
and the "Humane" Treatment of Animals' (1994) 46 Rutgers Law Review 721.
'7 Gary L Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Temple University Press, 1995).
' Robert Garner, 'Animal Welfare: A Political Defense' (2006) 1 Journal of Animal
Law and Ethics 161.
' Ibid 170.
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The course then focuses on the practical implications of the core
tenet of Francione's argument: the property status of animals. The
argument proposed by Wendy Adams in this regard is compelling. 20 By
first describing the classification role that law plays, and the dichotomy
the law creates between 'subject' (humans) and 'object' (everything
else, including animals), Adams is able to provide an account of the
descriptive and prescriptive power such a classification has, as well as
its invalidity. 21 Adams, perhaps unlike the more polemic writers in this
field, also provides an outline of how it might be possible to integrate
and accommodate (but not assimilate) the interests of animals in an
anthropocentric legal system. 2 2
The effect of animals' status as property and Adams' approach and
solutions are then tested in three case studies. Using such case studies
shows the practical application of the various competing approaches to
the status of animals, and borrows the technique of critical legal studies
movement to explain and expose assumptions in seemingly black-letter
law.23 First, students examine the Ontario case of Nakhuda v. Story
Book Farm Primate Sanctuary,' which dealt with the ownership of a
Japanese snow macaque dubbed the 'Ikea Monkey': so named because
of his escape from his owner's custody into a Toronto Ikea store. The
case determined who owned the macaque (named 'Darwin'): Ms
Nakhuda or the farm sanctuary where the City of Toronto had placed
him after his capture by animal services. The case was entirely decided
using common law principles of ownership of wild animals: the
presumption is wild animals are only capable of ownership when they
are in their owner's possession, subject to limited exceptions.25 MS
Nakhuda and Darwin did not meet any of these exceptions, and thus she
was no longer the owner of Darwin once he escaped; the sanctuary, who
had possession, was now his owner. Whilst doubtless the Court arrived
at the just result (Ms Nakhuda kept Darwin in very unsatisfactory
conditions), it is the method that it used to get there which is
noteworthy: not once did the Court consider the interests of Darwin and
which potential owner was best placed to protect those interests. Such
was an effect of Darwin being mere property.
In contrast, the New Zealand case of Sydney v Sydney2 6 _ a simple
decision over the division of relationship property after a separation -
shows an alternative approach. The Sydneys had jointly owned a dog,
Milo. Rather than determining who would be the owner simply based
on the claims of Mr and Mrs Sydney, the Court held that ownership
ought to be decided primarily on the basis of what was in Milo's best
interests. Since Mr Sydney had a large rural property and Mrs Sydney
20 Wendy Adams, 'Human Subjects and Animal Objects: Animals as "Other" in Law'
(2009) 3 Journal of Animal Law and Ethics 29.
21 Ibid 35-41.
22 Ibid 41-49.
23 Anderson, above n 5, 206ff, where the author shows how to inject critical legal
studies analysis into property law through the use of a detailed case study.
24 Nakhuda v. Story Book Farm Primate Sanctuary (2013) ONSC 5761.
25 Ibid [16].
26 Sydney v Sydney [2012] NZFC 2685.
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had a small urban apartment, the Court held that Milo would better
enjoy the custody of Mr Sydney. Although such an approach was not
mandated by the relevant legislation, it did provide the Court with wide
discretion on how to approach the matter, and thus this case provides a
clear and uncontroversial example where the interests of animals can be
prioritised over their status in the law as property. Finally, however, the
very recent case of Finlinson v Police,2 7 shows the reverse. In that case,
an appeal against a sentence for intentional damage was successful on
the basis that the sentencing judge had taken into account that the
damage was against the victim's beloved pet horse (Mr Finlinson had
shot and killed the horse to spite his ex-partner). Since the crime was
one against property, 28 the sentencing judge should have not considered
the interests of the horse or the special emotional connection that the
victim had with the horse when determining a sentence. The
pedagogical value of such case studies is to show the various ways that
the property status of animals has an impact on their interests, but
simultaneously allows students to see (and critique) how that impact is
often determined on a case-by-case basis: the courts in both Sydney and
Finlinson might have arrived at very different results had different
judges presided.
Finally, this part of the course looks at two instances where human
rights are in direct conflict with the interests or rights of animals, in
order to consider what happens when the rights of marginalised
communities are weighed against the (even further) marginalised
interests of animals. First, students look at New Zealand's 2010 ban on
shechita, more commonly known as 'kosher slaughter', when an
exception to normal standards for animal slaughter under New Zealand
law that required pre-stunning of cattle and poultry was unilaterally
revoked by the relevant Government minister. Joel Silver - a
Melbourne barrister - provides an excellent detailed account of
shechita, its treatment in the law, and its conflict with animal interests, 29
and students are asked for their views on whether the consciousness of
animals prior to slaughter under shechita is reconcilable with the
consequences for the Jewish community - and its members' rights to
religious practice - of such a ban.
The second example is whether the state has a place in regulating
those cultural practices of indigenous peoples which conflict with
animal welfare standards. Students look at Dominique Thiriet's
analysis 30 of practices within Australian Indigenous communities - and
the prospects of reconciling those practices with modern standards - as
well as the interesting approach of Queensland in its Animal Care and
27 Finlinson v Police [2016] NZHC 224.
28 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), s 269(1): 'Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding 10 years who intentionally or recklessly destroys or damages any property
if he or she knows or ought to know that danger to life is likely to result.'
29 Joel Silver, Understanding Freedom of Religion in a Religious Industry: Kosher
Slaughter (Shechita) and Animal Welfare (2011) 42 Victoria University of
Wellington Law Review, 671.
o Dominique Thiriet, 'Tradition and Change - Avenues for Improving Animal Welfare
in Indigenous Hunting' (2004) James Cook University Law Review 159.
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Protection Act 2001. That jurisdiction has changed the approach
(referenced by Thiriet) from exempting recognised cultural practices
from the Act's purview, 3 1 to a far more limited exemption (only where
such practices cause as little pain as is reasonable). 3 2 Students are asked
whether this is either an appropriate compromise, veiled cultural
imperialism, or still insufficient regard for the interests of Australia's
native fauna.
B Part B: The Regulation of Human-Animal Relationships
in New Zealand
The second part of the course looks at New Zealand's regulation of
the human-animal relationship. Since it governs most of those various
relationships, the Animal Welfare Act 1999 ('AWA') features
prominently in that analysis. After looking at the history and general
design of the AWA, students look at its key components. In general, the
AWA operates by separating the regulation of 'care of animals' from
'conduct toward animals'. Regarding 'care of animals', those who are
in charge of animals have a general obligation to ensure those animals'
'physical, health and behavioural needs' are met, 3 3 defined by the AWA
as what is known elsewhere as the 'Five Freedoms'. 34 The regulation of
'surgical procedures' (including what they are, and who may perform
them) and the transport of animals is also covered in this part of the
AWA. 35 Part 2 of the AWA regulates the offending which was hitherto
known as cruelty towards animals, and is now known as wilful or
reckless ill-treatment of animals. Ill-treatment is defined both in general
terms regarding the effect of an action on an animal36 but also includes
a range of per se offences (e.g. tongue piercing and animal
baiting/fighting).
Part 2 also regulates the hunting and trapping of wild animals. Each
part has a degree of case law which has elucidated, for instance, the
definition of 'in charge' of animal, 37 at what point the failure to ensure
the five freedoms of an animal becomes ill-treatment 38 and the
problematic nature of 'unnecessary pain and suffering' .39 In general,
3' Ibid 167; Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld), s 8, now amended.
32 Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) 41A.
33 Animal Welfare Act 1999 (NZ), s 10.
3' Animal Welfare Act 1999 (NZ), s 4, defined as: proper and sufficient food and water;
adequate shelter; the opportunity to display normal patterns of behaviour; physical
handling in a manner which minimises the likelihood of unreasonable or unnecessary
pain or distress; and protection from, and rapid diagnosis of, any significant injury or
disease.
3 Animal Welfare Act 1999 (NZ), ss 15-23.
36 Animal Welfare Act 1999 (NZ), ss 28-30. 'lll-treat' is defined in s 2 of the Act as
'causing the animal to suffer, by any act or omission, pain or distress that in its kind
or degree, or in its object, or in the circumstances in which it is inflicted, is
unreasonable or unnecessary.'
' Kunicich v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals HC Whangarei,
CRI-2008-488-67, 13 October 2009.
3' Balfour v R [2013] NZCA 429.
3 Garrick v Silcock [1968] NZLR 595 (CA); Waters v Braithwaite (1911-13) All ER
677 (KB); Hawker v Hammett [1971] NZLR 830 (SC).
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however, there is a paucity of consistent case law that helps refine the
policy of (and approach to) the AWA. More often than not, I rely on
case law that predates the AWA, but this practice is illustrative in itself:
despite being hailed as revolutionary, the AWA is still fundamentally
similar to its predecessors, and thus that early case law remains
(unfortunately) very relevant. Throughout this analysis, students are
encouraged to critically assess the performance and structure of the
AWA using the approaches learned in the first part of the course. It is
through looking at the regulation of the animal-human relationship in
practice that students can see how the issues raised by the authors in
that part manifest in the legal framework.
After a detailed examination of these core parts of the AWA,
students look at its more specialised aspects. This includes, in
particular, codes of welfare: delegated legislation that set minimum and
specific standards for the physical, health and behavioural needs of
animals in particular industries. There are eighteen such codes in
operation, covering everything from commercial slaughter and rodeo,
to companion cats and llamas.40 Codes of welfare are, simultaneously,
a positive tool that allows a high degree of specificity in determining
welfare standards, and, arguably, one of the AWA's biggest flaws. The
National Animal Welfare Advisory Council - the body that usually
create such codes (and the regulations enforcing them) before
recommending them for acceptance by the relevant minister - may
recommend regulations that prescribe standards that 'do not fully meet'
the general obligation to ensure the physical, health and behavioural
needs of animals referenced above.4 1 It is their capacity to undermine
the codification of the five freedoms that have made codes of welfare
the target of regular criticism4 2 and provide students with a powerful
example of the importance of good legislative design.
Other specialised parts of the AWA examined include scientific
research, testing and teaching involving animals, enforcement and
sentencing. Each part has its own, usually negative, issues that warrant
separate and targeted analysis. At the end of this analysis of the AWA,
students ought to have a clear understanding and mastery of an entire
legislative regime, as well as being able to question the strength of this
jurisdiction's claim to being a 'world leader' in animal welfare:
progressive legislation in theory is for naught if does not lead to a
progressive approach to animal welfare in practice. Students learn to
question the worth of broad legislative statements found in the AWA,
and the assumption that legislation, by virtue of its status, is always
enforced government authorities. Furthermore, possessing the ability to
critique welfarism, students are able to question whether such
4 A full list is available on the Ministry of Primary Industries' website:
<www.mpi.govt.nz/protection-and-response/animal-welfare/codes-of-welfare>.
41 Animal Welfare Act 1999 (NZ), s 183A(1)(b).
42 See, eg, Peter Sankoff, 'Five Years of the "New" Animal Welfare Regime: Lessons
Learned from New Zealand's Decision to Modernize its Animal Welfare Legislation'
(2005) 11 Animal Law 7; Joanna Tuckwell, 'Animal Welfare Act: Codes of Welfare'
[2009] New Zealand Law Journal 267.
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legislative statements are instead subterfuge for the perpetuation of
unjustifiable animal exploitation.4 3
However, the regulation of the animal-human relationship is not
entirely contained within the AWA, and the remainder of the classes
are dedicated to New Zealand's regulation of dogs,4 4 this jurisdiction's
lack of regulation of some forms of entertainment involving animals 4 5
and animals within the wild.4 6 Finally, students are introduced to purely
common law approaches to regulating the human-animal relationship,
specifically through the law of tort,4 7 and the potential for international
law responses to animal rights and welfare.4 8 In this way, I attempt to
introduce students first to normative critiques of the human-animal
relationship, before detailing the various ways the law regulates that
relationship. Approaching the course in this way is not necessary of
course: the normative analysis in Part A could always follow, rather
than precede, the descriptive quality of Part B, and present alternative
approaches to the status quo. Or, as noted above at the beginning of this
paper, that analysis could be absent from the course altogether.
However, it is my experience that students derive a great amount from
learning to effectively critique an entire area of the law, and they are
best equipped to do if they understand the critiques of the status quo
before undertaking an analysis of it. Regardless of whether students
accept the arguments presented in Part A, they have the ability to
question an area of legal regulation, rather than taking it at face value.
IV ASSESSMENT
Topics in which the law has an impact on the animal-human
relationship are multifarious, and the course simply does not have
capacity to deal with them all. Accordingly, my assessment of students
includes a (voluntary) research paper and presentation. This allows
those students passionate about a particular area involving animals and
the law to undertake a specialised research project that either covers
areas not examined in the course or considers an aspect of the course
with more depth or application. While I work with each student to
develop the parameters of their research project and provide advice on
which sources to use in order to commence their research, the project is
otherwise self-driven, teaching students skills in both developing an
argument and finding the resources to support that argument. Students
43 Anderson, above n 5, 210, with regards to the language of 'property rights'.
' Controlled by the Dog Control Act 1996 (NZ).
45 Most notably thoroughbred horse and greyhound racing, which, although under the
purview of the Animal Welfare Act 1999 (NZ), are predominantly regulated through
voluntary industry standards.
46 Controlled by various legislation, including the Wildlife Act 1956 (NZ); Wild Animal
Control Act 1977 (NZ); Conservation Act 1987 (NZ); and Marine Mammal
Protection Act 1978 (NZ).
4 Enger McCartney-Smith, 'Can Nonhuman Animals Find Tort Protection in a
Human-Centered Common Law?' (1998) 4 Animal Law 173.
48 Miah Gibson, 'The Universal Declaration of Animal Welfare' (2011) 16 Deakin Law
Review 539.
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present their research projects at a symposium, which their colleagues
in the course (and wider Faculty of Law students and academic staff)
attend. Holding such a symposium has the benefit of introducing them
to such an event, but also allows other students to learn about topics not
covered in the course. Research topics have been as varied as a critique
of the 2010 ban on bullfighting in Catalonia, New Zealand's ban on
cosmetic testing on animals (introduced in 2015); and an in-depth
analysis of caged-egg farming (and the regulation thereof). Students
field questions from both their colleagues and from me, allowing them
to employ the critical analysis skills learned in the course.
V CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion details one approach to designing a
syllabus for a course in animal law. There are, obviously, many
different routes and approaches to animal law. Depending upon the
jurisdiction and its regulation of the human-animal relationship, the
course may well need to reflect different assumptions and issues. For a
jurisdiction like New Zealand, however, I have found that the approach
I have taken to this area of law is an effective one. New Zealand, much
more so than many other jurisdictions, relies upon its agricultural sector
for its economic livelihood. 4 Simultaneously, we have an animal
welfare regime that is regarded as world-leading. It is, in my opinion,
thus a perfect candidate for examining the cognitive dissonance that
sometimes pervades this area of the law and question whether it is in
fact possible to meaningfully protect the welfare of those whose
exploitation we depend upon. In teaching this course, my goal was to
introduce students to this question, and critique New Zealand's
response to it. I hope that this paper, in any small way, encourages
others to do so as well.
4 See above n 1.
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